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Abstract
Voting theory has become increasingly integrated with computational social
choice and multiagent systems. Computational complexity has been extensively
used as a shield against manipulation of voting systems, however for several voting
schemes this complexity may cause calculating the winner to be computationally
difficult. Of the many voting systems that have been studied with regard to election
manipulation, a few have been found to have an unweighted coalitional manipula-
tion problem that is NP-hard for a constant number of manipulators despite having
a winner problem that is in P. We survey this interesting class of voting systems
and the work that has analyzed their complexity.
1 Introduction
Research in voting theory has become increasingly important due to the ubiquity of vot-
ing systems. While voting is most typically used for political or organizational elections,
recently it has become relevant as a tool in multiagent systems and distributed artifi-
cial intelligence. From recommender systems [GMHS99, PHG00] such as those seen in
Netflix which makes recommendations based on user activity, to consensus mechanisms
for planning in artificial intelligence [ER91] and search engine and metasearch engine
design [Lif00, DKNS01], mechanisms that aggregate individual ‘votes’ have far-reaching
applications. Many fields of study in computer science such as mechanism design and
∗Supported in part by grants NSF-CCF-0915792 and NSF-CCF-1101479.
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algorithmic game theory have become intertwined with research in voting theory. In this
paper we concentrate on results in manipulation, that is, strategically changing one’s
vote so as to change the result of the election.
Manipulation, as opposed to other ways of influencing election results, does not change
the structure of the election (as in control [BTT92] and cloning [Tid87, EFS10]) or in-
volve an external actor bribing voters to change their preferences (as in bribery [FHH09]
and campaign management [EF10a, SFE11]). Manipulation does not require going out-
side of the election model but merely involves voters picking their optimal votes. Thus
manipulation is the most immediate and frequently relevant of these problems.
The most representative subproblem of manipulation is unweighted coalitional ma-
nipulation (UCM). The model is simpler than one with weighted voters and so the focus
is squarely on the voting rule itself, not on the interplay of differently weighted vot-
ers forming a coalition. As such, results in UCM are a purer test of a voting system’s
vulnerability to manipulation.
We will first explore the history and key results of voting theory that imply significant
issues with all voting systems, and subsequently we will show how we can cope with some
of these difficulties through complexity theory.
1.1 Voting Theory
Voting has long been used as a tool for collaborative decision making, with democratic
government known to have existed at least as far back as 6th century BCE in ancient
Greece. For nearly as long people have studied voting in an attempt to find the best
election methods and solve problems related to voting.
One milestone in the study of voting is the work of 13th century mystic Ramon Llull.
Llull, a prominent Franciscan, was involved with the Catholic church and researched
methods for electing church officials. Among his extensive body of work, encompassing
at least 265 titles on subjects ranging from controversial theological viewpoints to ro-
mantic fiction, Llull’s contributions to voting theory stem from three works: Artifitium
Electionis Personarum, En qual manera Natana fo eleta a abadessa (Chapter 24 of his
novel Blaquerna) and De Arte Eleccionis, all featuring variants of a pairwise election
system we now know as Condorcet voting [HP01, Szp10].
In the eighteenth century, the Marquis de Condorcet developed one of the first criteria
for evaluating voting systems. Condorcet’s criterion is that, for a given election, if there
exists a candidate that beats all other candidates in pairwise contests, then that candi-
date must be the winner of the election. It is a somewhat surprising result that such a
candidate will not always exist due the possibility of cycles in the pairwise societal pref-
erences. Condorcet proposed this criteria and showed that many popular voting systems
do not meet it. Those that do are called Condorcet methods, or Condorcet-consistent
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voting systems. Elections using Condorcet methods can be viewed as a number of pair-
wise majority-rule elections1 or in the case of an election with two candidates, exactly
equivalent to a majority-rule election. Hence the literature often refers to Condorcet
methods as variants of the majority rule [Ris05].
Condorcet methods have often been contrasted with Borda voting, which takes com-
plete preference orderings as the votes and gives points to each candidate based on the
number of candidates they are ranked above in each vote. For instance a vote denoting a
is preferred to b is preferred to c would give two points to a, one to b, and none to c. There
are fervent arguments between proponents of the two systems, debating the importance
of the Condorcet criterion [New92, Saa06, Ris05], in a rivalry dating back to the Marquis
de Concorcet’s criticism of Borda voting when it was first introduced [Szp10].
One persistent concern in elections is that some of the participants may be able to vote
strategically thus unfairly gaining an advantage over honest voters. Pliny the Younger’s
attempts to manipulate the Roman senate circa 105 CE is possibly the earliest recorded
instance of strategic behavior in elections [Szp10]. The senate, presiding over a murder
trial, were divided into three blocs: those who favored acquittal, banishment, or death for
the accused. The senators were more or less evenly distributed among the three positions,
with the acquittal bloc (headed by Pliny) being slightly larger than the other two. The
normal method of voting was similar to the current justice system in most countries: The
senate would first vote on the guilt of the accused, followed by a vote on the punishment
(banishment or death). Considering how the blocs were aligned, the probable outcome
of the first election would be a decision of guilty, followed by banishment. To give his
faction an edge, Pliny proposed the senators vote for acquittal, banishment or death
in a single ternary-choice election. However, his strategy backfired. The death penalty
faction, fearing an acquittal, voted for banishment.
Pliny’s story holds more than just strategy and counter-strategy: Pliny convinced the
senate of the fairness of a single ternary-choice election by stating it aligned naturally
with the principle of voting qua sentitits, or according to your true preferences. His
attempt proved unsuccessful but serves as an excellent example of the problem of getting
people to vote honestly. While this problem was recognized by voting theoreticians
through history, it was either dismissed or attempts to solve it were limited at best. For
instance, Llull documents that voters were required to give an oath to vote sincerely,
and Jean-Charles de Borda famously dismissed criticism of his system’s vulnerability to
manipulation by saying “My scheme is only intended for honest men” [Bla58].
Later work drew from game theory to more formally model voter strategy and to
analyze its possibilities, especially in the work of Allan Gibbard [Gib73] and Mark Sat-
terthwaite [Sat75]. We will first explore the work of Kenneth Arrow, who initiated the
1A majority rule decides on the alternative that receives the majority of the votes.
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modern study of voting theory and introduced the election model that has become the
standard.
1.2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Arrow’s seminal work in modern social choice theory [Arr50, Arr63] originated in an
attempt to formalize an aggregate function for social opinion. Aggregate mechanisms
existed previously in welfare economics: Called welfare functions, they attempted to
measure societal welfare for a number of alternative possibilities by aggregating the util-
ity or welfare of individuals (measuring, for instance, the impact of a change in fiscal
policy or tax rates). These mechanisms all shared the assumption that as subjective
a concept as individual utility could be compared or quantified. A breakthrough came
with the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function [Ber38] which inspired Arrow’s own
aggregate mechanism, also called a social welfare function2. Like the Bergson-Samuelson
model, Arrow broke from previous economic models by considering an individual’s vote
to be their ranked preferences rather than a collection of numerical utilities over the
alternatives. Thus the output of the social welfare function is a ranked ordering of the
alternatives as well. Arrow argues that this is a more appropriate model for aggregate
functions due to the difficulty of interpersonal comparisons of utility.
Arrow’s key result, known as Arrow’s impossibility theorem, shows that no social
welfare function can satisfy all of a set of five reasonable criteria whenever there are more
than two alternatives. By reasonable criteria we mean these conditions “. . . accord with
common sense and with our intuition about fairness and the democratic process” [Szp10].
In formalizing his aggregate mechanism, Arrow laid down two postulates that directed
the construction of individual preferences, and outlined the aforementioned five charac-
teristics.
The first postulate states that for any pair of alternatives a, b, every individual will
always have some opinion between them: individuals can be indifferent between them
(generally represented as aIb or bIa, denoting indifference between a and b), or prefer
one alternative to the other (generally represented as aPb in the case that a is preferred
to b). The second postulate is that an individual’s preferences must be transitive, thus
disallowing cycles in individual preference orderings. Note that this requirement is not
universally held in voting theory, and intransitive preferences are sometimes considered
reasonable when voters use different criteria to decide between different pairs of alter-
natives [Hug80]. Consider the example of an individual Jeff who has to rent a car, and
is willing to pay a little more for additional space. Between a compact and a midsize
car, Jeff always chooses the midsize, since he has to pay just a little more for additional
comfort. Similarly, between a midsize and a fullsize car, Jeff prefers a fullsize car. But
2Differences between the two functions are elaborated on throughout Arrow’s paper [Arr50].
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between a fullsize car and a compact, Jeff finds the price difference to be too great, and
chooses the compact car instead.
Arrow defines five reasonable criteria for social welfare functions: unrestricted do-
main, monotonicity, nonimposition, independence of irrelevant alternatives and nondic-
tatorship.
Unrestricted Domain By the two aforementioned postulates, an individual’s prefer-
ences are represented as an ordering complete over the set of alternatives. Any restriction
on which sets of orderings are permitted as input to the function violates the democratic
nature of the mechanism and would fail to satisfy this criterion. Unrestricted domain
would be violated in the example of elections held in a despotic state where only votes
with the current ruler ranked first are allowed.
Nonimposition The second criterion states that the function should not allow inclu-
sion or preclusion of outcomes irrespective of the preferences of the electorate. This
criterion implies the social outcome should depend entirely on the set of individual pref-
erence orderings. An example of imposition could be an election in a theocracy where
only candidates from the state religion are permitted to be elected.
Monotonicity The third property, monotonicity, states that an individual cannot
harm an alternative’s position by ranking it higher. In other words, if an aggregate
preference ordering holds that alternative Ted is preferred to alternative Jeff, then an
individual cannot harm Ted’s aggregate position by ranking him above Jeff in his or
her ordering, all other individual orderings being constant. This property implies that
that the aggregate decision must be responsive to and representative of the individual’s
preferences.
In the later version of his work, Arrow replaced monotonicity and nonimposition with
the combined property of the Pareto criterion, or unanimity [Arr63]. The Pareto criterion
is slightly stronger than monotonicity since it incorporates nonimposition. It states that
for any two alternatives a and b, if an individual preference ordering prefers a to b with
all other individual preferences indifferent between these two alternatives, then the social
outcome also prefers a to b.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives The fourth property, independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (IIA), implies that individual preferences for any pair of alternatives
should not be influenced by other alternatives. A famous anecdote attributed to Sidney
Morgenbesser [Pou08] illustrates IIA: Morgenbesser, ordering dessert in a restaurant,
was informed by the waitress that the dessert choices were apple pie and blueberry pie.
Morgenbesser chose apple pie. A few minutes later, the waitress returned and informed
him that cherry pie was also available. “In that case,” said Morgenbesser to the utter
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confusion of the poor waitress, “I’ll have blueberry.”
IIA and the possibility of strategic behavior in a voting system are mutually exclusive:
the presence of one in a voting model indicates the absence of the other. While any
honest preference relation between a pair of alternatives would not be influenced by
extraneous alternatives, strategic behavior often requires them. Consider a Borda election
between two alternatives Jeff and Mike where a certain voter prefers Mike, the stronger
candidate, to Jeff. A new candidate, Ted, is introduced that the voter prefers to all
others. The voter, then, instead of his true preference ordering Ted > Mike > Jeff (where
Ted > Mike implies that Ted is preferred to Mike), might misrepresent his preferences as
Ted > Jeff > Mike, in order to weaken Ted’s strongest opponent, Mike. In other words,
the introduction of Ted results in the voter switching his preferences for Jeff and Mike.
Nondictatorship The fifth property states the function should not permit an individ-
ual who is a dictator, i.e., for a given profile of individuals, the function cannot reflect
any one individual’s preferences, irrespective of the preferences of all others in the profile.
Arrow proved that any thusly defined acceptable social welfare function, meeting
all these criteria, cannot decisively aggregate the preferences of a profile of individuals if
there are more than two alternatives. This result essentially meant that any social welfare
function violated the most basic thresholds for acceptability, thus any such function would
have to compromise on meeting at least one of these five criteria. Arrow, in discussing this
problem opined that compromising on an unrestricted domain was the only reasonable
alternative [Arr50].
One of the more notable approaches to this problem actually preceded Arrow’s work:
In 1948 Scottish economist Duncan Black wrote about an intriguing property of societal
preferences called single-peakedness [Bla48, Bla58]. Consider plotting a preference order-
ing with the horizontal axis representing a linear ordering of alternatives and the vertical
axis representing their rank in the ordering. If the resulting curve (drawn from joining all
alternative-representing points together) has a single peak (defined to be a point flanked
by either lower-ranking points on both sides, or only on one side if the peak starts or ends
the curve) then we can state that the preference ordering is single-peaked with respect
to the linear ordering on the horizontal axis. For a given profile of preferences, if there
exists at least one linear ordering such that all votes are single-peaked with reference to
this linear ordering, then we pronounce the profile to be single-peaked, or admitting the
property of single-peakedness.
Black showed that aggregate functions admitting single-peaked preference profiles
(with respect to some linear ordering) meet all of Arrow’s criteria except for unrestricted
domain. We lose this criterion since a linear ordering that induces single-peakedness does
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Figure 1: A preference profile that is single peaked for the ordering abcd. The votes are a >
b > c > d (solid), b > c > d > a (dashed), and c > d > b > a (dotted).
not exist for every preference profile3. Therefore, if an aggregate function is to admit only
single-peaked input, it would have to exclude certain preference orderings, restricting the
domain.
Another approach by Amartya Sen [Sen69] showed the existence of aggregate mech-
anisms that have all of Arrow’s criteria but implement a relaxation of transitivity called
quasi-transitivity. This permits the existence of certain preferences that violate standard
transitivity—for example, for alternatives a, b, c the following preference profile is accept-
able: aIb, bIc, aPc. Sen also discusses an aggregate function where the input, instead of
individual preference orderings, is individual utility functions.
Brams and Fishburn showed that approval voting similarly has very desirable prop-
erties when we restrict the preference domain [Nie84]. In the case that voters have
dichotomous preferences (that is, they can divide the candidates into two groups: one
they they approve of and one they do not), approval voting has many positive properties,
including immunity to strategic voting and the Condorcet criterion [BF78]. In the general
case with unrestricted preferences, the system no longer has these properties [Nie84].
The impact of Arrow’s work can be summed up in a quote attributed to Paul Samuel-
son [Pou08], “What Kenneth Arrow proved once and for all is that there cannot possibly
be . . . an ideal voting scheme.” The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem held even more dis-
mal news: In addition to being less-than-ideal, all voting schemes are also vulnerable to
manipulation, unless they admit dictators.
3The existence of a single-peaked profile would (partially) depend on the set of least-preferred
alternatives across all given orderings. For example, in the case of exactly three alternatives a, b, c,
any profile of two or more preference orderings having a total of two alternatives a, b ranked last, linear
orderings acb and bca exist relative to which the profile is single-peaked. For methods to determine
single-peakedness, we refer the reader to the work of Ballester and Haeringer [BH11] and Escoffier et
al. [ELO¨08].
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1.3 Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
In the 1970s Alan Gibbard [Gib73] and Mark Satterthwaite [Sat75] independently ex-
tended Arrow’s theorem for voting systems in a model that incorporated strategic mis-
representation of preferences. They proved that no strategy-proof voting system existed
for elections with three or more alternatives, unless the voting system allowed dicta-
tors. A strategy-proof voting system is one where no manipulating strategy can exist
in elections using this voting system. While this result revolutionized voting theory, it
had been speculated previously: In 1960, William Vickrey, when discussing individuals
strategically misrepresenting their preferences in Arrow’s model [Vic60], stated that “it is
clear that social welfare functions that satisfy the non-perversity [monotonicity] and the
independence [IIA] postulates and are limited to rankings as arguments, are also immune
to strategy.” In addition, the Dummett-Farquharson conjecture of 1961 [DF61] parallels
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem transformed voting theory for two reasons: one
was the aforementioned result that nondictatorial voting rules were susceptible to strate-
gic voting (manipulation) in cases with three or more outcomes, and the second was
the adoption of the arcane science of game theory from Neumann and Morgenstern’s
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior [vNM44], published just four years prior to
Arrow’s work. While the influence of game theory was implied (and acknowledged) in
Arrow’s social welfare function [Wil72], the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proofs were
more explicit in their treatment of voting functions as game-theoretic mechanisms. This
provided the field of voting theory with a set of tools to examine a whole range of
scenarios—for example, the motivations for the electorate to vote dishonestly, or their
reaction to changes in the structure of the voting rule, or attempts to form coalitions to
further their individual utility.
In Gibbard’s work, a voting scheme or social choice function is built upon a construct
called a game form [Gib73]. A game form is similar to a game construct in game the-
ory [vNM44] applied to a voting model: players are voters, and any player’s strategies
are the set of all possible orderings of preferences (unless restricted for specific scenar-
ios), over a set of alternatives or candidates. Game forms, unlike games, do not have
functions assigning utilities for each player for a given action (or chosen strategy) or for
a scenario of chosen strategies of all the players. Instead the social choice function has
the concept of an honest or sincere strategy: Among the set of strategies for each player
is a specially marked strategy denoting the honest representation of preferences for that
player. This can be used to compare outcomes (which may be a preference ordering or a
single alternative) for a voter’s different strategies, to see if one is less or more preferable
to another in the honest ranking of alternatives.
This social choice function will be immune to manipulation only if each voter has a
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dominant strategy, a strategy that will be at least as good as any other for that voter
no matter what any other voter does. Otherwise, if a voter does not have a dominant
strategy, then they might possibly be motivated to change their vote from their true
preferences in order to obtain a better outcome. A social choice function where each
voter has a dominant strategy (and hence is immune to manipulation) is said to be
straightforward.
The proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem relies on the Vickrey conjecture: a
voting scheme (defined with the property of unrestricted domain) is strategy-proof if and
only if it has the properties of IIA and unanimity. Since Arrow showed that no aggregate
function with more than two outcomes can satisfy all of his model’s criteria, such a voting
system then is necessarily a dictatorship. In other words, we have that any voting system
with at least three outcomes will either be a dictatorship or it will be manipulable. A
similar result, the Duggan-Schwartz theorem [DS00], exists for voting systems that elect
multiple candidates.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem presents a problem and accepts a solution sim-
ilar to Arrow’s theorem. By Black’s results, voting schemes that permit only single-
peaked preferences restrict the domain of the function, but can have all other Arrow
criteria, including unanimity and IIA, which together imply strategy-proofness. Thus,
relaxing the condition of unrestricted domain is necessary for voting schemes that re-
sist manipulation. Another example of this is Gibbard’s development of probabilistic
mechanisms [Gib77, Gib78]. Procaccia took a similar approach by designing strategy-
proof probabilistic voting systems that are similar to standard deterministic voting sys-
tems [Pro10].
1.4 Computational Difficulty of Manipulation
Another solution to the problem of inherent manipulability in voting was proposed by
Bartholdi along with Tovey, Trick, and Orlin in a series of papers that started the field
of computational social choice [BTT89a, BTT89b, BO91]. Their approach was to select
voting schemes where manipulation is computationally difficult to carry out, i.e. where
the manipulation problem is NP-hard. Our definition of the manipulation problem is
that of constructive coalitional manipulation: i.e., does there exist a set of votes for the
manipulating coalition that causes their preferred candidate to win the election? This
subsumes the case of a single manipulator and contrasts with destructive manipulation,
which is concerned with preventing a certain candidate from winning.
Bartholdi et al.’s initial work also highlighted the problems of selecting systems with
complexity. Their impracticality theorem [BTT89b] is another instance of systems meet-
ing seemingly reasonable criteria thereby inducing undesirable properties.
The theorem states that any fair voting system requires excessive computation to
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determine the winner, making it impractical—a highly disturbing result. This theorem
followed work by Kemeny [Kem59], Young and Levenglick [YL78] and Gardenfors [Gar76].
According to Bartholdi et al., a voting system is fair if it meets the Condorcet cri-
terion, the condition of neutrality (symmetry in its treatment of candidates, implied by
IIA [GPP09]), and the condition of consistency (if disjoint subsets of the voters voting
separately arrive at the same preference ordering, then voting together always produces
this same preference ordering as well). Their theorem states that computation of the
winner in any such fair voting system is NP-hard.
The previously mentioned property of consistency (also called convexity [Woo94] and
separability [Smi73]) has been proven to be present in ranked voting systems (those in
which a vote is a ranking or ordering of preferences) only if they happen to be scoring
protocols as well (where alternatives receive a certain number of points depending on
their position in the ordering) [You75]. Scoring protocols are often incompatible with the
Condorcet criterion (refer the aforementioned debate on Condorcet versus Borda) thus
unsurprisingly so far we know of only one voting system, Kemeny scoring [Kem59], that
meets all three conditions [YL78]. Kemeny scoring then, is NP-hard, but additionally it
has been shown to be complete for parallel access to NP [HSV05].
However, this does not imply other voting systems are immune to having an in-
tractable winner problem: systems such as Dodgson meet only two of the three fairness
conditions—that of the Condorcet criterion and neutrality but not consistency—however
computation of the winner in Dodgson is known to be not only NP-hard [BTT89b] but
complete for parallel access to NP [HHR97], similar to the result for Kemeny scoring.
Research focusing on tractable voting systems4 was more promising: While Bartholdi
et al. gave us a greedy algorithm that finds a manipulating vote for several tractable vot-
ing systems in polynomial time [BTT89a], two voting systems—second-order Copeland
and single transferable vote [BTT89a, BO91]—proved to be resistant and were shown to
have a manipulation problem that is NP-hard. Research in this field remained dormant
for the next fifteen years until a revival starting in 2006 brought about results for most
common tractable voting systems.
In this paper we are concerned with a restricted version of the manipulation problem.
We survey tractable voting systems that resist manipulation in the unweighted coalitional
manipulation (UCM) model with only a constant number of manipulators. This limited
case subsumes hardness results in the weighted coalitional manipulation (WCM) model
or with variably-sized coalitions, thus making a case for UCM being a stronger class of
manipulation. We include both the initial work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a]
and Bartholdi and Orlin [BO91] that achieved the first results in this area and the recent
resurgence of interest in this problem that has resulted in a number of new outcomes.
4A voting system is tractable if calculating the winner takes at most polynomial time.
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1.5 Terms Defined
An election is defined to be an instance of a voting system, comprising a voting rule vr,
a set of candidates C and a set of votes V . A voting rule is a function that takes as input
a set of votes and a set of candidates and outputs a set of winners. Unless explicitly
stated otherwise, references to n and m are defined as follows: n = ||V || and m = ||C||.
A vote is defined to be a linear ordering over the set of candidates. The advantage of a
candidate ci over cj (hereafter referred to as adv(ci, cj)) is the number of votes that rank
ci ahead of cj , with values ranging from 0 to n. The net advantage of a candidate ci over
cj is adv(ci, cj)− adv(cj, ci), with values ranging from −n to n. A netadv score between
two candidates ci and cj is represented as netadv(ci, cj). By definition we can see that
netadv(ci, cj) = −netadv(cj , ci), thus one netadv score can represent both directions.
UCM (unweighted coalitional manipulation) is defined to be a decision problem as
follows.
Given An election, namely, a voting rule vr, a set of voters V such that V = VNM ∪VM ,
where VM is the subset of voters that form the manipulating coalition and VNM is
all other voters, and a set of candidates C containing a distinguished candidate c.
Question Does there exist a set of votes for VM such that vr over the complete set of
votes yields c as the winner?
We use the format UCM2Cope to refer to the UCM problem in second-order Copeland
and likewise for other election systems.
2 UCM in Single Transferable Vote
Single transferable vote (henceforward STV) is a voting system with a long history. As
esteemed a figure as John Stuart Mill said it was “among the greatest improvements yet
made in the theory and practice of government.” It determines the winners with a simple
multiround procedure that redistributes votes placed for less popular candidates. Also,
unlike many of the esoteric voting systems studied in voting theory, STV has a history of
being used for real-world political elections, in the United States and around the world.
The STV vote tallying procedure is as follows. Give a point to each candidate for
each first-place vote it receives. If any candidate is the majority winner (i.e. with more
than half the total points), that candidate will be the only winner of the election. If
no majority winner exists, then select the candidates with the fewest number of points,
remove them from consideration, and for the voters who currently give their support
to these candidates, reallocate their support by giving their points to the next-highest
ranked candidate on their ballots still under consideration. Repeat this procedure until a
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winner is chosen or all candidates are removed. If the latter occurs, then all of candidates
that were removed in the last round will be the winners.
The complex, shifting behavior of STV with multiple candidates is what gives it the
resistance to manipulation we discuss here, but it also leads to STV failing to possess some
very desirable voting system characteristics. Notably it does not possess the property of
monotonicity: It is possible for a voter to increase his or her ranking of a candidate and
for that candidate to subsequently do worse in the election. This was enough for Doron
and Kronick [DK77] to refer to it as a “perverse social choice function,” and it certainly
is a flaw of concern.
2.1 STV is Resistant to Manipulation
We show resistance to manipulation through a conventional, if difficult, reduction based
on Bartholdi and Orlin’s work [BO91]. Their work was actually directed towards showing
that the EFFECTIVE PREFERENCE problem is NP-complete. EFFECTIVE PREF-
ERENCE is the problem of finding if a single voter can cause the preferred candidate
to win an election. This is effectively the same as UCM with a single manipulator, and
we will prove that this problem is NP-hard for STV with a proof based on the afore-
mentioned work [BO91]. The proof is structured as a reduction from the exact cover by
three-sets problem.
Exact Cover by Three-Sets (X3C)
Given A set D = {d1, . . . , d3k} and a family S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of sets of size three of
elements from D.
Question Is it possible to select k sets from S such that their union is exactly D?
In other words, the goal of the problem is to find if there is an appropriately-sized
set of subsets which covers each of the elements in D. Since each Si has exactly three
elements and k such sets from S must be chosen, the set of subsets must be an exact
cover with no repeated elements in all subsets chosen.
Proof. We will describe a reduction from an instance of X3C to a instance of the un-
weighted manipulation problem for STV. Note that since the reduction will only require
a single manipulator, this shows that UCMSTV is NP-hard even for only a single manip-
ulator.
Given an instance of X3C (D,S) we construct the election as follows. Let the following
comprise the candidate set C:
• The possible winners c and w;
12
• The set of “first losers” a1, . . . , an and a1, . . . an, one of each corresponding to each
subset Si;
• The “second line” b1, . . . , bn and b1, . . . , bn, one of each corresponding to each subset
Si;
• The w-bloc d0, . . . , d3k, each of whose voters will just prefer them to w;
• The “garbage collector” candidates g1, . . . , gn.
We will now describe the set of voters. Where we use ellipses, the remainder of a vote
is arbitrary for our purposes and will not effect the result of the election.
• 12n voters with preferences (c, . . . );
• 12n− 1 voters with preferences (w, c, . . . );
• 10n+ 2k voters with preferences (d0, w, c, . . . );
• For each i ∈ {1, . . . , 3k}, 12n− 2 voters with preferences (di, w, c, . . . );
• For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 12n voters with preferences (gi, w, c, . . . );
• For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 6n+4i− 5 voters with preferences (bi, bi, w, c, . . . ) and for
the three j such that dj ∈ Si, 2 voters with preferences (bi, dj, w, c, . . . );
• For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 6n + 4i − 1 voters with preferences (bi, bi, w, c, . . . ) and 2
voters with preferences (bi, d0, w, c, . . . );
• For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 6n+4i−3 voters with preferences (ai, gi, w, c, . . . ), 1 voter
with preferences (ai, bi, w, c, . . . ), and 2 voters with preferences (ai, ai, w, c, . . . );
• For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 6n+4i−3 voters with preferences (ai, gi, w, c, . . . ), 1 voter
with preferences (ai, bi, w, c, . . . ), and 2 voters with preferences (ai, ai, w, c, . . . ).
This reduction works by requiring the elimination order of a subset of the candidates
to correspond to an exact cover over B in order for c to win the election. Namely, c will win
the election if and only if I = {i | bi is one of the first 3n candidates to be eliminated} is
an exact cover. Furthermore, there is a preference order for a single manipulator that will
force I to be an exact cover if one exists. We will now consider the relevant properties
of the election and show that this is the case.
Since this election is a single-winner STV election with more than two candidates,
the scoring process will proceed for a number of rounds and a number of candidates will
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be eliminated as the rounds progress. The first 3n candidates to be eliminated will be
a1, . . . , an, a1, . . . , an, and exactly one of bi or bi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Candidate c initially has 12n votes, while c’s primary rival w has 12n − 1 votes.
Every voter that does not have c as their first choice ranks c directly below w, and so
c can only gain more votes if w is eliminated. In order to do so, the manipulator must
ensure that w does not gain additional votes before it is eliminated, as otherwise w would
have gained votes against c and c would have been eliminated first. The manipulator
must consequently make sure that no candidate is eliminated such that any voter most
prefers that candidate and prefers w second-most. This is the case with every voter that
prefers one of the dj candidates, so w will gain a large number of votes if one of them
is eliminated. Therefore if any dj candidate is eliminated before w, c cannot possibly
win. For every bi candidate that is eliminated, bi gains a large number of votes, pushing
it higher than 12n in score and preventing it from being eliminated early. Also, every
dj ∈ Si gains two votes, pushing them high enough to prevent their early elimination.
Thus eliminating bi protects the dj candidates associated with the set Si. Conversely,
for every bi that is eliminated, d0 gains two votes and bi gains a large number of votes,
preventing bi from being eliminated early. Thus for every i only one of bi or bi can be
eliminated before c or w.
The a candidates are the other candidates that can be eliminated early. For every ai
that is eliminated, ai gains two votes, bi gains one vote, and gi gains the rest of ai’s votes.
The effect of this is that now ai has been promoted above bi and bi in the overall ranking,
and since bi also gained a point over bi, bi will be the next to be eliminated instead of
bi. Thus by controlling which of ai or ai is eliminated first, we control which of bi or bi
is eliminated early.
Hence we can show that the candidate c will win the election if and only if I = {i | bi
is one of the first 3n candidates to be eliminated} is an exact cover. We know that either
bi or bi will be among the first 3n eliminated candidates. If bi is the one eliminated, then
every dj ∈ Si will gain two votes and will each have at least 12n votes total, protecting
them from early elimination. If I is an exact cover, this will be true for every dj as each
of them is covered by some selected bi and so each of them will win over w. Also, since d0
gains two points for every one of the bi eliminated, d0 will gain at least 2(n−k) votes and
will receive at least 12n votes overall, pushing it over the score of w as well. Thus after
the first 3n candidates have been eliminated, w will have the least score with 12n − 1,
having gained no votes other than it’s initial first-place votes, and it will be the next
candidate to be eliminated. The candidate c will then gain a large number of votes from
the elimination of w and will go on to win the election.
If the set I defined above does not correspond to an exact cover, c cannot win the
election. If I is not an exact cover, some candidate dj will not gain the two points from
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a corresponding bi being eliminated. Thus dj will only have 12n − 2 votes after the
first 3n candidates are eliminated while the other remaining candidates have at least
12n− 1, leaving dj as the next candidate to be eliminated. The candidate w then gains
points from dj’s elimination, preventing c from gaining points against w and winning the
election.
If an exact cover exists, a single manipulator can construct it’s preference order as
follows to ensure c is a winner. For an exact cover I, if i ∈ I, let the ith candidate in
the preference order be ai and otherwise ai. The rest of the preference order is arbitrary.
This will result in the following order of elimination of the first 3n candidates: For i ∈ I,
ai, bi, ai will be eliminated in that order in positions 3i−2, 3i−1, and 3i. For i /∈ I, ai, bi, ai
will instead be the candidates to be eliminated. For i ∈ I, since this preference ranks ai
over ai, ai will gain one more vote and thus ai will be eliminated first. This then gives
two votes to ai and one more to bi, making bi the next least-preferred candidate. When bi
is eliminated, bi gains a large number of votes, so ai is now the least-preferred candidate
and is eliminated next. The rounds proceed similarly in the case that i /∈ I and ai is
preferred instead. Thus the set {i | bi is one of the first 3n candidates to be eliminated}
will correspond to an exact cover and c will win the election.
If no exact cover exists, no matter how a manipulator votes, at least one of the dj
candidates will not receive the protective boost from the elimination of the corresponding
b candidate as previously described. This candidate will then be eliminated early, leading
to w being boosted past c in votes and preventing c from winning.
Thus even just setting the first n rankings for the ballot of a single manipulator for
STV is NP-hard, and the system is resistant even to this very limited case of manipula-
tion.
3 UCM in Borda Voting
Borda voting is a classic voting system dating back at least to the eighteenth century.
It was introduced by the French mathematician and engineer Jean-Charles de Borda
to remedy the failure of plurality in reflecting the wishes of the electorate when used
with more than two candidates: In plurality the candidate with the most votes is not
necessarily preferred to all other candidates. Borda voting is very similar to a system
introduced in the 15th century by Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus [Szp10].
It has a rich and varied history of real-world use: In some form it has been used in
political elections in Slovenia and the Micronesian countries of Kiribati and Nauru, in
the Eurovision contest, the election of the board of directors of the X.Org foundation,
and even in sports, in the election of the Most Valuable Player award in Major League
Baseball. Borda is one of a class of systems known as scoring protocols, where each vote
awards points to each candidate depending on their ranking in the vote. The winners are
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candidates with the highest sum of points over all the votes. In the case of Borda voting,
candidates receive linearly descending points for progressively less favorable positions in
the votes, with the top position awarding m−1 points, the next position awarding m−2
points, and so on down to 0 points for the lowest position.
It was long an open problem whether UCMBorda was hard in general, though ma-
nipulation with a single manipulator has long been known to be easy [BTT89a]. A
greedy algorithm that can find a set of successful manipulating votes in polynomial time
that is at most one larger than the optimum manipulative coalition size is known as
well [ZPR08]. Recently, Betzler et al. [BNW11] and Davies et al. [DKNW11] proved
Borda-manipulation to be NP-hard for instances with two or more manipulators.
3.1 Borda is Resistant to Manipulation
Both Betzler et al. [BNW11] and Davies et al. [DKNW11] prove their results by re-
duction from the problem of 2-numerical matching with target sums, a known NP-hard
problem [YHL04] that closely corresponds to the problem of allocating points to the
nonfavored candidates in the election.
2-Numerical Matching with Target Sums (2NMTS)
Given A sequence a1, . . . , ak of positive integers with
∑k
i=1 ai = k(k+1) and 1 ≤ ai ≤ 2k.
Question Are there permutations ψ1 and ψ2 of 1, . . . , k such that ψ1(i) +ψ2(i) = ai for
1 ≤ i ≤ k?
Preliminaries For manipulation to work, nonfavored candidates must be ranked low
enough in manipulative votes such that the number of points they gain by said votes do
not prevent the preferred candidate from winning. To that end we define the gap to be
the maximum number of points nonfavored candidates can gain by all manipulative votes
while still allowing the preferred candidate to win. In any Borda instance with a favored
candidate c∗, m other candidates, and t manipulators, the gap gi for a candidate ci is
score(c∗) + t ·m− score(ci). Here score(c) refers to the Borda score for the candidate c
over the nonmanipulative votes. We assume these gap values g1, . . . , gm to be ordered in
a nondecreasing fashion.
Result 1 Recall that the awarded points for the last j candidates in a vote will range
from j − 1 to 0, hence the sum of their points equals j(j − 1)/2. Thus for any successful
manipulation instance, we must have that
∑j
i=1 gi ≥ t·j(j−1)/2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
We define an instance to be tight if
∑j
i=1 gi = t · j(j−1)/2. Thus, in a tight instance, for
manipulation to be successful, the number of points a nonfavored candidate gains from
manipulative votes must be exactly equal to its gap value.
Proof. Given any instance of 2NMTS we construct a UCMBorda instance (C, V, p) as
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follows. The candidate set C consists of candidates c1, . . . , ck and the preferred candidate
p, and thus the range of Borda points is from 0 to k. The set of votes V consists of a
manipulating coalition of size two and a set of nonmanipulating votes of size three. The
instance is constructed such that the gap gi for any nonfavored candidate ci is 2k − ai.
In this context, the Borda problem can be considered as follows: for every nonfavored
candidate ci, can we assign a position in each of the manipulating votes such that the
points ci gains from said votes is ≤ gi? This constructed instance of Borda manipulation
will have a solution if and only if the 2NMTS instance has a solution.
Direction 1 Given a solution to 2NMTS, we can obtain a solution for the Borda instance
as follows: Preferred candidate p is placed in the first position in both manipulating
votes. A solution to 2NMTS exists so we have two orderings ψ1(i), ψ2(i) such that
ψ1(i) + ψ2(i) = ai. For every candidate ci, (1 ≤ i ≤ k) set its position to ψ1(i) + 1
in the first manipulative vote, and ψ2(i) + 1 in the second manipulative vote. The
corresponding Borda points are obtained from subtracting this position number from
||C|| = k + 1. Therefore the points ci has gained from both manipulative votes is
(k + 1 − (ψ1(i) + 1)) + (k + 1 − (ψ2(i) + 1)) which equals 2k − ai = gi, permitting p to
win.
Direction 2 Given a solution to the Borda instance, we have a solution for 2NMTS as
follows: By construction,
k∑
i=1
gi =
k∑
i=1
(2k − ai).
Since
k∑
i=1
ai = k(k + 1),
k∑
i=1
(2k − ai) = k(k − 1).
Hence, this Borda instance is tight for j = k and t = 2 (from Result 1) and conse-
quently each nonfavored candidate ci gains exactly gi points from the manipulative votes.
If posi(1) and posi(2) are the positions for ci in the two manipulative votes, points gained
from these positions total (k+1−posi(1))+(k+1−posi(2)) = gi = 2k−ai, which yields
posi(1) + posi(2) = ai + 2. Therefore setting ψ1(i) = posi(1)− 1 and ψ2(i) = posi(2)− 1
gives us a solution for 2NMTS.
As mentioned earlier, we assume by construction gi = 2k−ai. This requires construct-
ing the set of nonmanipulative votes such that the deficits for each candidate relative
to the preferred candidate map precisely to the target sums in the original problem.
Executing this involves complicated construction and the addition of a large number of
“dummy” candidates to pad out the remaining positions and precisely set the required
deficits for the primary candidate set [BNW11] (in Davies et al., such padding is done
with voters [DKNW11]). Thus the constructed instance has a much larger candidate set
than a voter set (though it remains polynomially bounded), but it suffices to prove the
desired hardness result.
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4 UCM in Copeland Elections
Copeland voting is a voting system with a long history. One version of the system was
discovered by the 13th century mystic Ramon Llull, and then another variation was
discovered by A.H. Copeland in the 1950s. It is a Condorcet voting system.
Copeland voting is in fact a family of voting systems, parametrized on how ties
are handled. In Copelandα, the score of a candidate c in an election E is winsE(c) +
α·tiesE(c), where winsE(c) denotes the number of pairwise victories and tiesE(c), the
number of ties of the candidate c in the election E. Llull’s system is Copeland1, while
“Copeland voting” has been used to describe Copeland0.5 or to describe Copeland0.
Different parameter values subtly alter the behavior of the system and complicate the
task of analyzing its computational properties, as we will explore.
4.1 Copeland is Resistant to Manipulation for Most Values of α
UCMCopeα is in P when there is only one manipulator [BTT89a], but it is known to be
resistant to manipulation even with two manipulators for α ∈ [0, 0.5) ∪ (0.5, 1] [FHS10,
FHS08]. The complexity of UCMCopeα for α = 0.5 remains unknown as of date. Different
proofs were required to show resistance to manipulation for different parameter ranges, as
the behavior of the system changes in subtle but significant ways with different values of
the parameter. We will describe the proof that was used to show hardness for Copelandα
for α ∈ {0, 1} [FHS10]. Both these cases were proved by Faliszewski et al. [FHS10]
through similar reductions from X3C.
Exact Cover by Three-Sets (X3C)
Given A set D = {d1, . . . , d3k} and a family S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of sets of size three of
elements from D.
Question Is it possible to select k sets from S such that their union is exactly D?
Proof. The proof constructs a UCMCopeα instance from an X3C instance (D,S) using
graph representations to equate both problem instances. A election for the reduction can
be constructed without an explicit collection of votes as such a collection can be elicited
from the set of netadv or adv scores for all pairs of candidates5. The graph representation
of the election can be constructed from the set of netadv or adv scores as well6. Both
these constructions are polynomially bounded in the size of the set of candidates and the
value of the netadv function. Thus, using these techniques we can construct the election
given a partial set of significant candidates, the netadv scores for all pairs of candidates,
5Refer Appendix A.
6Refer Appendix B.
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and the lead in Copeland score that the distinguished candidate has over each specified
candidate.
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Figure 2: Gadget used in the Copeland1 manipulation NP-hardness proof [FHS10]: The gadget
is constructed for each Si with numbers for each candidate showing the lead in Copeland score
the preferred candidate has over them.
Given any instance of an X3C problem, the proof defines the set of candidates as the
elements of sets D and S, one preferred candidate p, and one main adversary candidate
c (the candidate holding the highest Copeland score prior to manipulation) as well as
auxiliary candidates used for padding and constructing the mathematical gadgets. Such
gadgets (also called widgets [CLRS01]) are a common feature in reduction construc-
tions: They are typically intricate subgraphs that are constructed for each element of the
mapped-from problem. They align calculations and enforce constraints so as to ensure a
tight mapping between instances of the two problems.
The numbers of the election are constructed in such a way that prior to manipulation,
the elements of D each beat p by 1 unit of Copeland score and c beats p by n− k units
of Copeland score. However, the elements of S each lose to p by 3 units. Hence any
successful set of manipulating votes must cause the elements of D and c to lose just
enough pairwise contests against the elements of S to erode their lead over p without
making any Si a possible winner. This involves selecting a subset of S that beats every
candidate from D but still leaves enough elements of S to lower c’s score by n−k points.
The construction of such a vote corresponds to selecting a k-sized subset of S that covers
exactly the elements of D, that is, a solution to the X3C problem. Hence, a solution to
UCMCopeα gives us a solution to X3C.
5 UCM in Second-Order Copeland
Solutions for breaking ties in Copeland voting attempt to choose the more “powerful”
candidate as the winner, which can be defined in a number of ways. One such method is
second-order Copeland. It selects the candidate whose set of defeated opponents (here-
after referred to as DOc for a candidate c) has the higher sum of Copeland scores. We
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will let sum score(S) for a set of candidates S be the sum of the Copeland scores for
candidates in S, and so sum score(DOc) gives the second-order Copeland score for a
candidate c.
Second-order Copeland has been used by the National Football League and the United
States Chess Federation to break ties, and has a special place in voting theory: it was
the first tractable voting system for which the manipulation problem was shown to be
NP-complete, even for just one manipulator [BTT89a].
5.1 Second-Order Copeland is Resistant to Manipulation
The problem of unweighted coalitional manipulation in second-order Copeland, hereafter
referred to as UCM2Cope, is NP-complete even for one manipulator [BTT89a]. Verifying a
given solution is clearly in P as we simply have to calculate Copeland scores and second-
order Copeland scores for each candidate. To prove UCM2Cope is NP-hard we show a
polynomial-time reduction from 3,4-SAT, a known NP-hard problem [Tov84].
3,4-SAT
Given A set U of Boolean variables, a collection of clauses Cl, each clause composed of
disjunctions of exactly three literals, which may be a variable or its complement,
and each variable occurs in exactly four clauses.
Question Does there exist a Boolean assignment over U such that each clause in Cl
contains at least one literal set to true?
To facilitate the reduction we construct a graph representation of a second-order
Copeland election that encodes the given 3,4-SAT instance. We will use a election graph
representation with vertices representing candidates and directed edges representing the
result of pairwise contests.
Proof. Given a 3,4-SAT instance, we create a second-order Copeland election graph as
follows: Every clause (C1 to C||Cl||) and every literal is a candidate, represented as a ver-
tex in our graph. The manipulating coalition’s chosen candidate is a separate candidate
C0. All pairs of vertices have directed edges between them, representing decided pairwise
contests, except for any variable and its complement. The decided contests cannot be
overturned by our manipulators, while undecided contests can be shifted in either direc-
tion according to the manipulating vote. Clauses beat (that is, have a directed edge to)
literals they contain, and lose to all other literals.
In addition to these candidates derived from the 3,4-SAT instance, we pad the election
with a number of auxiliary candidates in such a way to achieve the desired Copeland
scores and second-order Copeland scores for each of the candidates. We will have that
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Figure 3: A partial representation of the resultant election graph: Clauses represented are
C1(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3), C2(x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3), C3(¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3) and C4(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3). Each clause
vertex beats the variables (or their complements) that are its component literals. The dotted lines
indicate undecided (second-order Copeland) contests between variables and their complements.
all the clause candidates and C0 are tied with the highest Copeland score. We will also
have that each clause candidate Ci has sum score(DOCi) = sum score(DOC0)− 3.
The second-order Copeland score for C0 will be independent of the variable-complement
contests. For all possible outcomes of the variable-complement contests, C0 still beats
every candidate except for the clause candidates. Recall that the elements for every
clause candidate’s defeated-opponent set are their component literals. Their second-
order Copeland scores and the final result of the election will then depend on how each
of the variable-complement contests are decided.
Consider if any clause candidate Ci’s literals win all their contests. The sum score(DOCi)
increases by 3 points and Ci is tied with C0 for first place. Therefore, in order for C0 to
be the unique winner, at least one element of each clause candidate’s defeated-opponent
set must lose one of their contests. For any variable x, we can interpret a directed edge
from x to ¬x as setting x to true. A vote that allows C0 to win, then, would correspond
exactly to each clause having at least one literal evaluating to true. In other words, we
have a solution for UCM2Cope if and only if we have solution for 3,4-SAT. Therefore
UCM2Cope is NP-hard with just a single manipulator.
6 UCM in Maximin
Maximin voting, also known as the Simpson-Kramer method, is a typical Condorcet
voting system. As such it deals with contests between pairs of candidates, specifically
their netadv scores. To find the winner under maximin, given a netadv function over
the set of candidates, we first select the lowest netadv score for each candidate k in C,
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i.e., we select the minimum score for netadv(k, k′) for all k′ in C such that k′ 6= k. The
winner is the candidate with the highest such score. We can trivially see that a candidate
with a minimum netadv score greater than 0 will be the Condorcet winner and there can
only be one such candidate, thus maximin is a Condorcet voting system.
Calculating the maximin winner is easily seen to be polynomial in the size of the
election, but Xia et al. [XCPR09] prove that for two or more manipulators the problem
of UCMmaximin is NP-complete.
6.1 Maximin is Resistant to Manipulation
UCMmaximin is NP-complete for two or more manipulators [XCPR09]: Verifying an in-
stance is easily seen to be polynomial in the size of the election as we can calculate the win-
ner in polynomial time. To prove UCMmaximin is NP-hard we construct a polynomial-time
reduction from the vertex-disjoint-two-path problem, known to be NP-complete [LR78].
Vertex-Disjoint-Two-Path problem (VDP2)
Given A directed graph G and two sets of vertices u, u′ and v, v′ such that all four
vertices are unique.
Question Do there exist two paths u→ u1 → . . .→ uj → u
′ and v → v1 → . . .→ vk →
v′ in G such that each path is a set of vertices disjoint from the other?
Proof. To facilitate our reduction construction from a graph problem such as the vertex-
disjoint-two-path problem to maximin, we first construct a graph representation of max-
imin elections. A complete set of votes is not required to represent an election7. We can
construct the same given just a netadv (or adv) function. Also, there exists a bijection
between the netadv function and directed edges of a complete antisymmetric graph such
that given one, we can represent it in terms of the other8.
Pcoal is the set of votes of the manipulating coalition and Pnoncoal is the set of all other
votes. The term netadvnoncoal indicates the netadv score obtained by considering only
the noncoalitional votes with netadvcoal similarly defined. M is the size of the coalition
and c is the candidate supported by the manipulating coalition.
Given a VDP2 instance, that is a graph G(VG, E) and vertices u, u
′, v, v′ ∈ V , we
obtain a graph G′ using the following constructions and assumptions:
• Every vertex in our graph is reachable from u or v.
• There are no directed edges u→ v′ or v → u′.
7Refer Appendix A.
8Refer Appendix B.
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• We add special edges u′ → v and v′ → u such that EG′ = E ∪ {(u
′, v), (v′, u)}.
Our UCMmaximin instance then is as follows:
• Set of candidates C = VG.
• The set of Pnoncoal preferences.
– ∀c′ ∈ C : c′ 6= c, netadv(c, c′) = −4M ;
– netadv(u, v′) = netadv(v, u′) = −4M ;
– For all other edges (x, y) in E, netadv(y, x) = −2M − 2;
– For all other vertex pairs a, b, netadv(a, b) = 0.
Regarding Pcoal votes, we can freely assume that every coalition vote will rank c
first, thus giving netadvcoal(c, c
′) = M and netadvnoncoal∪coal(c, c
′) = −3M . Thus, in our
construction, scores for netadv(c, c′) are fixed for all candidates c′ ∈ C. In order for
c to be the winner, at least one netadv score must be less than −3M for every other
candidate. We will see that in our construction this can occur if and only if there are
two vertex-disjoint paths in G′.
Direction 1 The existence of vertex-disjoint paths u → u1 → . . . → uj → u
′ and
v → v1 → . . .→ vk → v
′ yields a Pcoal that makes c the winner. In order to construct the
manipulative preferences, we will make use of a connected subgraph over G′ containing
all the vertices, but with u → . . . → u′ → v → . . . → v′ → u as the only cycle in the
graph.
We can construct Pcoal votes in 3 parts as follows: Each manipulator vote will rank c
the highest, followed by the vertex-disjoint-path vertices, followed by the other vertices.
Other-vertex ordering: These vertices will be ordered in the votes based on a linear
order extracted from the single-cycle subgraph.
Vertex-disjoint-path orderings: We have two vertex-disjoint-path orderings: u →
. . .→ u′ → v → . . . → v′ and v → . . . → v′ → u→ . . .→ u′ and thus two possible vote
constructions for Pcoal. We construct M − 1 votes as per the first ordering and 1 vote as
per the second9. Thus netadv(c, c′) increases by M points but every other netadv score
increases by less thanM points, making c the winner. The calculations are as follows for
the complete (coalitional and noncoalitional) set of votes:
• netadv(u, v′) = −4M + (M − 1)− 1 = −3M − 2
• netadv(v, u′) = −4M + 1− (M − 1) = −5M + 2
9Switching these orderings results in the same outcome.
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For any other candidate c′ 6∈ {c, u, v}, we can see that there exists some candidate d in
every vote of Pcoal that beats c
′, i.e., the lowest netadv score for c′ is netadvcoal(c
′, d) = −M ,
and thus for the complete set of votes the (lowest) netadv for any such candidate c′ is no
more than −2M − 2 −M = −3M − 2. All the above netadv scores are less than −3M
for all values of M ≥ 2, thus c is the winner.
Direction 2 The existence of a Pcoal that makes c a winner yields a positive VDP2
instance in the graph G′:
Since c is the winner, we know that for any other candidate c′ in C, there exists a
candidate d that beats c′ such that:
• netadv(c′, d) < −3M ;
• There exists an edge (d, c′) in G′;
• d is ranked higher than c′ in a majority of the total votes and in at least one vote
in Pcoal—the proof of this is as follows.
Consider such an edge (d, c′)10: either (d, c′) is one of the special edges (v′, u), (u′, v′)
or (d, c′) ∈ E. If (d, c′) is a special edge, then at least one vote in Pcoal must prefer d to
c′ (since netadv(c′, d) < −3M). If (d, c′) ∈ E, then all M votes in Pcoal must prefer d to
c′.
For this d, we can choose a candidate that beats it with sufficient margin, and continue
to find such a candidate for the previous choice of d11. That is, we find a d for c′ starting
with u and then continue to find such a candidate after setting d to c′. There is only one
possible d for c′ as either u or v. Thus, we obtain a set of chained pairs recursively. This,
coupled with the facts that any vertex is reachable from u, v and the existence of special
edges (both by construction), we obtain a cycle of vertices which breaks into disjoint
sets along the special edges. Obtaining such a set of pairs with netadv less than −3M
is not possible without the existence of a (c-winner-making) Pcoal (as per the third item
above).
7 UCM in Tideman Ranked Pairs
Tideman ranked pairs (TRP) was conceived by Nicolaus Tideman in 1987 when attempt-
ing to define a voting system that “almost always” has the property of independence of
clones [Tid87]. It is defined as follows: given a netadv function over the set of candidates,
create a list by ranking the pairs in descending order of their scores. In the case of a tie
between two netadv pairs, e.g., netadv(a, b) = netadv(x, y), we break ties by ordering
10If there exists more than one such d we choose one arbitrarily.
11Choosing such a d is formalized in the proof of Xia et al. [XCPR09] as a composite function f .
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the pairs lexicographically according to an arbitrary ordering of the candidates. We add
the top-scoring pair to an election graph G12 if the resultant graph does not contain a
cycle. Otherwise we skip this pair and move on to the next one in the list. We continue
until we have considered all pairs. Since we now have a directed acyclic graph, there
must exist a source vertex, which we state to be the TRP winner.
7.1 TRP is Resistant to Manipulation
Xia et al. [XCPR09] found that UCMTRP is NP-complete even for one manipulator. We
can easily see that verifying a given solution to UCMTRP is in P. UCMTRP was proven
to be NP-hard by a polynomial-time reduction from 3SAT.
Three-Conjunctive-Normal-Form Satisfiability (3SAT)
Given A set U of Boolean variables, a collection of clauses Cl, each clause composed of
disjunctions of exactly three literals, which may be a variable or its complement.
Question Does there exist a Boolean assignment over U such that each clause in Cl
contains at least one literal set to true?
Proof. Given a 3SAT instance, we construct a UCMTRP election graph as follows. Clauses
C1 . . . C||Cl|| are vertices as is the coalition’s preferred candidate c. For each clause Ci, we
construct six other special clause candidates—three for the literals it contains and three
for their complements. Ci beats (has a directed edge to) the special clause candidates
corresponding to the literals it contains, which in turn beat the literals they correspond
to. We also have a C ′i such that it is beaten by the complement of the literals in Ci.
Candidate c starts out beating the Ci candidates but gets defeated (though by a smaller
margin) by the C ′i candidates. The intuition of this correspondence is that the edges
beating c are so weak and so far down the ordering that they are not added, leaving c to
be the source vertex (and TRP winner) if and only if there exists a solution to 3SAT. Thus
the UCM problem is NP-complete even in the case of a single manipulator. The proof of
Xia et al. [XCPR09] relies on mathematical gadgets to achieve this correspondence.
8 Conclusion
Our survey of UCM results can be seen as qualifying election systems by a single metric.
Determining which election system is superior is an ongoing debate often reflecting differ-
ing philosophies. Pierre-Simon Laplace in his lectures at the Ecole Normale Superieure
in 1795 attacked the e´le´ction par ordre de me´rite (election by ranking of merit) system
of his contemporary Jean-Charles de Borda [Szp10], later proposing a variation of the
majority rule in its place. Much of the modern literature on voting theory is still devoted
12As usual, VG = C and directed edges represent netadv scores.
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Voting rule Coalition size = 1 Coalition size ≥ 2
Copelandα(0 < α < 0.5)(0.5 < α < 1) P [BTT89a] NP-complete [FHS08]
Copelandα(α = {0, 1}) P [BTT89a] NP-complete [FHS10]
Copelandα(α = {0.5}) P [BTT89a] ?
Second-order Copeland NP-complete [BTT89a] NP-complete [BTT89a]
Single Transferable Vote NP-complete [BO91] NP-complete [BO91]
Maximin P [BTT89a] NP-complete [XCPR09]
Tideman Ranked Pairs NP-complete [XCPR09] NP-complete [XCPR09]
Borda P [BTT89a] NP-complete [BNW11, DKNW11]
Bucklin P [XCPR09] P [XCPR09]
Plurality with Runoff P [ZPR08] P [ZPR08]
Veto P [BTT89a] P [ZPR08]
Cup P [CSL07] P [CSL07]
Table 1: Table of UCM results for common tractable voting systems.
to advocacy for particular voting systems, arguing their superiority by one metric or
another [New92, Saa06, Ris05].
In our survey we showcase manipulation results for a particular class of voting sys-
tems, namely those with a tractable winner problem but where unweighted coalitional
manipulation is hard for a constant coalition size. The complexity of this case of UCM
has been determined for most common voting rules, though a few remain: Copeland0.5
remains unsolved even as results for all other parameter values have been found [FHS10].
Several related areas of research, however, remain more or less uncharted. The most
significant simplification in the literature is that most of the hardness results achieved
are just worst-case. Several papers have studied whether voting systems are difficult to
manipulate in a large fraction of instances, finding that manipulation can be easy in
the average case while being hard in the worst case [CS06, PR07b, PR07a]. Addition-
ally, approximation algorithms exist for several worst-case hardness results. Brelsford
et al. [BFH+08] formalized manipulation as an optimization problem and then studied
whether this version of the problem is approximable. Zuckerman et al. [ZPR08] dis-
covered an approximation algorithm for Borda manipulation before it was known to be
NP-hard, and Davies et al. [DKNW11] gave several other approximation algorithms for
this problem. In other results, approximation algorithms for manipulation of maximin as
well as families of scoring protocols exist [ZLR10, XCP10]. Other techniques include the
use of relatively efficient algorithms for the NP-complete integer partitioning problem to
solve manipulation instances [Lin11].
Conitzer et al. [CSL07] qualified the manipulation problem with an additional metric:
the minimum number of candidates that must be present for manipulation to be NP-
hard. Additionally their work breaks from the standard model and studies whether
manipulation is hard for cases where manipulators do not have complete information of
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all of the votes. Slinko explored how often elections will be manipulable based on the
size of the manipulative coalition [Sli04].
Research into how often elections can be manipulated [FKN08], and more general ar-
eas such as parametrization of NP-hard problems [Nie10] and phase transitions [CKT91,
KS94, Zha01] lead to a more nuanced approach to problem classification. Phase transi-
tions have been examined in the manipulation problem for the veto rule [Wal09].
Another issue is that votes are most commonly represented in the literature as tran-
sitive linear preference orderings over the set of candidates and the concept of irrational
votes has only been sparsely dealt with. Irrational (by which we mean intransitive)
votes, may be more apt for any number of real-world scenarios where voters tend to
rank candidates according to multiple criteria. Irrational votes are not represented as
a linear ordering but as a preference table which holds the voter’s choice for any pair
of candidates. For Copelandα for α ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}, manipulation is in P in the irrational
voter model, while it is known to be NP-hard for α ∈ {0, 1} in the standard voter
model [FHS10]. Thus voting systems may have different behavior with regard to manip-
ulation in the irrational voter model and it deserves more study. Another convention is
that the default definition of UCM is constructive—i.e., efforts are directed to making a
preferred candidate a winner, rather than preventing a certain candidate from winning.
Variations of UCM with a destructive approach is another area rich with possibilities.
UCM instances presented in this paper typically have a large number of candidates
and a smaller constant-sized coalition of manipulators. In contrast, cases with a small
number of candidates and a relatively large manipulating coalition might be considered
more natural. Betzler et al. [BNW11] mention a specific open problem in this area:
whether there exists a combinatorial algorithm to solve Borda efficiently with few can-
didates and an unbounded coalition size. Another open problem is solving a UCMBorda
instance having a coalition of size 2 in less than O(||C||!).
Another approach to the manipulation problem taken by Conitzer and Sandholm [CS03]
and Elkind and Lipmaa [EL05] is modifying voting systems to give them greater resis-
tance to manipulation. Both add an extra initial round of subelections between subsets
of the candidates. Conitzer and Sandholm [CS03] describe techniques that can make
manipulation NP-hard or even PSPACE-hard for these modified voting systems. Elkind
and Lipmaa [EL05] present a version of this technique that uses one-way functions to
construct the initial-round schedule from the set of votes. Reversing the one-way function
is computationally hard, preventing election organizers from gaming the initial round and
forcing their desired result in polynomial time. These techniques essentially construct
new voting systems by structurally augmenting standard systems to imbue them with
complexity.
Other related work includes the study of electoral control, which encompasses attempts
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by an election organizer to change the result by modifying the election structure in vari-
ous ways [BTT92, FHHR09, EF10b, HHR09], which also encompasses cloning, or adding
candidates very similar to existing candidates in an attempt to split their support [Tid87,
EFS10]. Other ways to influence elections include bribery and campaign management,
where in both cases a briber attempts to sway the result of an election by paying off a set
of voters to change their votes [FHH09, FHHR09, Fal08, EFS09, EF10a, SFE11]. These,
too, are problems endemic to many voting systems to which complexity can serve as a
defense.
Another possible response to the problems presented by Arrow’s theorem and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is to reconsider the standard model of the aggregate
function. Balinski and Laraki [BL07] introduce a model where voters give candidates
independent grades, such as the letter grades F to A or {good, average, bad}, similar to
approval voting or range voting, rather than ranking them in a linear order. In a sense this
represents a reversion to the pre-Bergson-Samuelson model of welfare functions. Balinski
and Laraki’s method defines the aggregate grade of each candidate to be the median
grade over all votes, unlike range voting where the aggregate grade is the average. We
can obtain a complete aggregate preference ordering of the candidates with this method
provided that ties can be broken. Balinski and Laraki give a tie-breaking mechanism that
successively removes one of the median-score-awarding voters from the votes for each tied
candidate and recomputes the median grades until they are no longer tied [BL07]. Their
approach does not rely on complexity but instead redesigns the election model to become
strategy-proof in a limited case defined by the authors.
Faliszewski et al. [FHHR11] showed that with a restriction to single-peaked pref-
erences, a wide range of manipulation and control instances that are NP-hard in the
general case turn out to be easy (though not any of the results we describe here). For
some voting systems these problems remain easy even with a partial relaxation of the
single-peaked model that allows for a small number of “mavericks”, whose votes are not
aligned with the single-peaked ordering [FHH11]. The single-peaked model is considered
“the canonical setting for models of political institutions” [GPP09], so this work calls the
significance of a number of hardness results into question.
After the birth of research in the manipulation problem with the work of Bartholdi et
al. [BTT89a], most research moved towards the weighted voter model and many results
for the weighted coalitional manipulation problem (WCM) were achieved [CSL07, HH07],
until the resurgence of interest in the UCM problem [BNW11, DKNW11, FHS10, FHS08,
XCPR09]. It can be argued that as compared to WCM, UCM is a better test of a voting
system’s vulnerability to manipulation. UCM serves as a special case of WCM and
hence subsumes its hardness results. In other words, if an election system is resistant
to manipulation in the UCM case, it will resist manipulation in the WCM case, but the
other direction does not necessarily follow. With this problem solved for most common
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voting systems, we look forward to the resolution of the remaining open problems as well
as new avenues of research into the manipulability of voting systems.
A Constructing an Election Given a netadv Function: the Mc-
Garvey Method
While the traditional representation of an election requires a set of votes, we can construct
these votes given a pairwise relation denoting preference over the set of candidates. This
method was given by McGarvey [McG53], and can be applied with very little modification
to a netadv function.
A.1 From a Preference Pattern to a Set of Votes
Theorem A.1. (McGarvey’s Theorem) Given a preference pattern we can elicit a set of
votes (defined to be strict and complete preference orderings over the set of candidates)
such that (the ordering derived from) the preference pattern is the result of the election.
Definition 1. A preference pattern is a set of relations over the set of candidates. The
relations are a preference relation (expressed as aPb viz. a is preferred to b) and an
indifference relation (aIb viz. a is neither preferred to b nor is b preferred to a).
Both relations are distinct for any pair of candidates - i.e., aPb implies ¬bPa, and
aIb implies bIa. Thus we will have m(m− 1)/2 pairs over both relations where m is the
number of candidates. McGarvey’s method constructs a set of votes as follows:
For each pair aPb with remaining candidates c1, . . . , cm−2, we construct two preference
orderings abc1 . . . cm−2 and cm−2 . . . c1ab
13. For each pair aIb, we construct abc1 . . . cm−2
and cm−2 . . . c1ba The idea is that on evaluation for these preferences, rankings of all
candidates besides a, b from these orderings will be equal, and the rankings of a, b reflect
the preference relation under consideration. Consider the example C = a, b, c, d. The six
pairs we consider are aPb, aPc, aPd, bP c, bPd, cPd.
To represent aPb we construct two votes abcd and dcab. Evaluating these two votes
in the context of pairwise rankings leads to two votes for aPb and no votes for any other
pair over the set of candidates. Similarly, for aPc, we construct acbd and dbac and so on.
The idea is that for all candidates besides the ones under consideration, preferences for
and against them cancel each other out. Hence the need for two votes for each pair. The
total number of thus-constructed votes is twice the cardinality of the preference pattern.
Thus in our example, we obtain a set of votes which yield exactly the relations in the
given preference pattern.
13Where candidates are listed in order of decreasing preference.
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A.2 From a netadv Function to a Set of Votes
We consider the following useful property of the netadv function when constructing the
corresponding election:
Theorem A.2. For all pairs of candidates ci, cj where ci 6= cj, the values of netadv(ci, cj)
are either all even or all odd.
Proof. Consider two blocs of votes where each bloc takes one side in a pairwise election.
Let the sizes of the blocs be x and y such that x+ y = n.
If n is even:
• Then x, y are either both odd or either both even since the sum components of an
even number are either both even, or both odd.
• The difference between two even numbers or two odd numbers is always even.
If n is odd:
• Then x, y are either odd and even, or even and odd, respectively, since the sum
components of an odd number are always a combination of even and odd.
• The difference between an even and odd number is always odd.
Thus, all the netadv values are either all even or all odd.
We can see that the netadv function corresponds to elements of a preference pattern:
netadv(ci, cj) > 0 corresponds to ciPcj, netadv(ci, cj) = 0 corresponds to ciIcj , and
netadv(ci, cj) < 0 corresponds to cjPci. However, the key difference between the netadv
functions and preference-pattern elements is that netadv has scores, which we must factor
into our construction.
Since we construct two votes for each pair of candidates, the problem of applying
McGarvey’s method to a netadv relation with an even score is trivial—for each of the
two preference orderings constructed we simply have n/2 such votes. In fact, given a
netadv function, if one netadv score is even, then (1) the number of votes will be even,
and (2) every netadv score in that set will be even. The converse also applies: if one
netadv score in a given set is odd, then the number of votes will be odd, and every netadv
score in the given set will be odd.
Applying McGarvey’s method to an odd set of netadv scores requires a slight tweak.
We first must select some arbitrary ordering of the candidates. Then for any netadv
score s = netadv(a, b) where a precedes b in the ordering, we construct s− 1 (net) votes
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(or units of score) exactly as in the case where the scores are all even (i.e., two preference
orderings, with (s− 1)/2 such votes for each one). In the case of s = netadv(b, a) where
a precedes b, we will instead create (s + 1)/2 pairs of votes to give a score of s + 1 for
b over a. To obtain the last points, we construct one preference ordering corresponding
to the previously chosen ordering of the candidates. This will give one net vote to every
pair a, b where a precedes b, and minus one vote where b precedes a. Thus we achieve
the desired odd numbers for each netadv input.
Number of Constructed Votes In the above two cases (netadv scores being even or
odd) we can see the upper bound on the number of votes constructed is one for every
unit of score across all netadv values. The size of the set of votes will be bounded
by
∑
ci,cj∈C
|netadv(ci, cj)|. Thus given a netadv function with bounded value, we can
construct a reasonably small set of votes.
B Graph Representation of the netadv Function
Consider a complete directed antisymmetric graph G(VG, E) where VG is the set of ver-
tices and E is the set of directed weighted edges. We can trivially see that there will
be m(m − 1)/2 directed edges, where m = ||VG||. Recall that this is the same as the
number of distinct scores required to represent a netadv function (where m is the number
of candidates). Thus we can represent a netadv function with such a graph G where VG
is the set of candidates C and E encodes the netadv function. Similarly, given such a
graph, we can obtain an equivalent netadv function.
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